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The Declining Information Content of Dividend Announcements 
and the Effects of Institutional Holdings 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We propose an explanation for the “disappearing dividend” phenomenon: a decline in the 
information content of dividend announcements, which reduces the propensity of firms to 
use dividends as a costly signal.  A reason for a decline in the information content of 
dividends is the rise in holdings by institutional investors that are more sophisticated and 
informed.  We indeed find a decline in CAR at dividend change announcements since the 
mid 1970s.  Across firms, CAR is a decreasing function of institutional holdings.  
Institutional investors exploit their superior information and buy before dividend 
increases. And, dividends are less likely to rise in firms with high institutional holdings. 
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I. Introduction 
 Fama and French (2001) present the phenomenon of the “disappearing dividend:” 
since 1978, the propensity of public companies to pay dividends has declined. They show 
that companies are continuously less likely to pay dividends, after controlling for their 
changing characteristics.  Grullon and Michaely (2002) document a decline in both the 
dividend payout ratio and in the dividend yield, and Allen and Michaely (2003) find that 
the number of firms that announce dividend increases has declined since 1978.  
We propose an explanation for the disappearing dividend: a decline in the 
information content of dividend announcements.  Dividends are a means to signal 
information and indeed, stock prices react positively to dividend change announcements 
(Aharony and Swary, 1980 and a survey in Allen and Michaely, 2003).  Signaling by 
dividends entails costs: shortfall in resources that requires raising capital, which is costly 
(Bhattacharya, 1979, Ofer and Thakor, 1987), higher tax (John and Williams, 1985) or 
suboptimal investment (Miller and Rock, 1985).   These costs are necessary to generate a 
signaling equilibrium.  The positive reaction of stock prices to announcements of 
dividend increases, in spite of their cost, reflects the positive information about the firm 
value that these announcements convey (see Handjinicolaou and Kalay, 1984).  Indeed, 
Ofer and Siegel (1987) show that following announcements of dividend changes, analysts 
update accordingly their expectations of the firm’s future earnings.  
Thus, if dividend increase announcements have become less informative, firms 
may want to save the dividend-related costs by reducing the use of dividends as means to 
convey information. Hence the phenomenon of disappearing dividends.  
Testing our proposition, we find the following: 
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a. There is a decline in the cumulative abnormal return, CAR, at the announcement 
of dividend increases since the late 1970s. This pattern is consistent with the 
documented decline since the late 1970s in the propensity of firms to pay 
dividends or increase dividends. Also, the negative CAR at dividend decrease 
announcements rose towards zero. 
b. The dividend response coefficient – the sensitivity of CAR to the magnitude of 
dividend changes – declines since about 1980. 
Given our evidence that the information conveyed by dividend news has been 
declining and given that dividend signaling is costly, there has been a decline in the use 
of dividends as means to convey information. This explains the “disappearing dividend” 
phenomenon.   
Next, we propose an explanation for the declining information content of 
dividends: the increased stockholdings by institutional investors, which are considered 
more sophisticated and informed than retail investors.  (We review some evidence on that 
in Section III.)  If institutional investors trade on their information about the firm’s value, 
then by the time that a dividend increase is announced, part of this information is already 
incorporated in its stock price and there is less additional information conveyed by the 
dividend increase announcement.   It follows that the role of dividends as a means of 
conveying information about the firm’s value is smaller in firms with high institutional 
holdings.  Consequently, a decline over time in the information content of dividend is 
partly due to the well-known increase in institutional stockholdings over time. 
Other factors may affect a decline over time in the information content of 
dividend news, such as the increased availability of public information about public 
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companies – investor newsletters, analyst reports, media coverage (specialized television 
and radio channels) and the recent increased use of the Internet.  Our explanation for the 
declining dividends does not exclude other explanations, 1 such as changes in taxes and 
investor sentiment.  These, however, are market-wide phenomena that affect the time 
series of the price reaction to dividend news and cannot be tested across stocks.  Since 
trended series can produce spurious correlations, we focus our tests on cross-sectional 
analysis. 
We test across stocks our hypotheses on the effects of institutional holdings, 
denoted INST, and find the following: 
a. CAR at dividend increase announcements is significantly lower in firms with 
higher INST. 
b. The dividend response coefficient is declining significantly as a function of INST. 
c. Institutional investors increase their holdings in stocks that subsequently raise 
dividends.  
d. The propensity of firms to increase dividends is a declining function of INST.  
These findings support in a number of ways our hypothesis that greater 
institutional holdings lead to lower information content of dividend news, which in turn 
makes signaling by dividends less valuable.  We suggest that this has contributed to the 
documented disappearance of dividends.   
Surely, signaling is not the only reason why firms pay dividends. Our study 
suggests that the signaling motive for paying dividends has declined over time, as evident 
                                                 
1  DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004) demonstrate the phenomenon of concentration of dividends: 
less companies – the larger ones – pay dividends, but their real dividends are rising. 
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from a decline in the information content of dividend news, and that this has been 
particularly strong in firms that have high institutional holdings.  (But dividends are also 
paid for other reasons.) 
An alternative explanation for our results is based on the institutional investors’ 
role as monitors of the firm’s management, which reduces agency costs (Gillan and 
Starks, 2001).  Dividends, which reduce free cash flows, subject the firm to screening and 
monitoring by the market when it raises capital (Easterbrook, 1984).  If monitoring by 
institutional investors substitutes for the monitoring role of dividends, dividend increases 
are less valuable in firms with large institutional holdings.  This explains both a decline 
over time in the stock price reaction to dividend increases, and a decline in dividends 
altogether. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we present the evidence on a decline 
in the information content of dividend announcements over time. In Section III, we show 
the effect of institutional holdings on the price impact of dividends and on the firms’ 
propensity to raise dividends to the level of institutional ownership and document the 
institutional investors’ trading patterns around dividend announcements. We summarize 
the results in Section IV and offer some concluding remarks. 
 
II. Stock price reaction over time to dividend announcements 
The signaling theory of dividends suggests that the effect of dividend change 
announcements on stock prices reflects information about future firm value. In this 
section, we estimate the stock price reaction to dividend change announcements and 
present evidence that it has been declining over time. 
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A.  Data 
We consider all regular quarterly dividend announcements on ordinary common 
stocks in the CRSP daily file for NYSE\AMEX stocks, starting in July 1962.  We exclude 
dividends defined as special, year-end, interim or non-recurring and dividends paid at 
other frequencies or in foreign currency, dividend initiations and resumptions, and 
dividend changes that result from mergers or acquisitions, stock splits, and other events 
that adjust prices.2  We require that there is no announcement of other distributions in a 
30-day window (days -15 to 15 day surrounding the announcement).  We also exclude 
firms in the financial service sector (SIC code from 6000 – 6999) or in the public service 
(utility) sector (4900-4999), closed-end funds, REITs, stock certificates and ADRs.  
These criteria result in 16,189 events of dividend changes: 14,911 dividend increases and 
1,278 dividend decreases. 
 
B.  Stock price reaction to dividend changes: pattern over time 
We first examine the pattern over time of CAR, the two-day cumulative abnormal 
return over days 0 and +1 (day 0 is the dividend announcement day), calculated as the 
difference between the stock return and the size-based portfolio to which the stock 
belongs.3  The annual average, CARy, is depicted in Figure 1 over the years 1962-2000. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
                                                 
2 Also excluded are dividend changes smaller than 0.5% which may reflect rounding of changes. 
3 We replicate the analysis using abnormal returns relative to CRSP beta-based portfolio. The results are 
qualitatively similar. 
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Our novel result here is that over time, the (absolute) stock price reaction to 
dividend change news (both increase and decrease), CAR, declines towards zero.  A 
decline actually begins in the mid-1970s after having peaked then. This pattern of CARy 
is similar to the pattern of the propensity to pay dividends over time, documented in a 
number of studies. In Fama and French (2001, Figure 5), the percent of firms paying 
dividends in the NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq rises between 1970 and 1978 and declines 
thereafter.  Allen and Michaely (2003) show a similar pattern over time for the number of 
companies that announce dividend increases, with a decline being the greatest during the 
1980s.  And Baker and Wurgler (2004) show a turning point in firms’ propensity to pay 
dividends after 1978, approximately where we find that CARy starts declining (Figure 1).  
The similarity between the patterns of the propensity to pay dividend and our 
documented pattern of CARy suggests that dividend decisions made by firms are 
positively related over time to the (absolute) stock price reaction to dividend changes.  
Firms’ propensity to pay dividends, which are costly, declines if dividends increase 
announcements have smaller effect on stock prices.  
Testing the time trend of CARy, we regress CARy on y (y = 1962, 1963, …, 2000). 
The following are the results:4 
Dividend increases:   
(1)  CARy =  0.43 – 0.0002⋅y     
(t =)  (5.03) (4.97)        R2 = 0.357 
                                                 
4 The two models are estimated together by the SUR method. The standard errors are corrected for 
hetersokedasticity and autocorrelation, using the Newey-West (1987) method with MA=1. 
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Dividend decreases:  
(2)  CARy =  -2.63 + 0.0013⋅y      
  (t =)  (7.26) (7.14)          R2 = 0.502 
The results show a significant decline over the years in the (absolute) stock price reaction 
to dividend change announcements.  Closer examination of Figure 1 suggests that there 
has been a regime shift in the mid 1970s for both dividend increases and dividend 
decreases. Whereas until then the CAR is largely flat, even increasing the early 1970s, it 
largely declines since then. Fitting models (1.1) and (1.2) to the data after 1975 shows a 
much better fit, but we do not present these results since they reflect data snooping. 
 
 
C.  The dividend response coefficient over time 
 The information content of the magnitude of the change in dividend yield, 
DDIVYj, is measured by the dividend response coefficient, α1, which Bernheim and Wanz 
(1995) call “the bang for the buck.” We estimate the following model: 
(3) CARj = α0 + α1DDIVYj + α2SIZENj + α3LTYLDj + ej .      
If DDIVYj is informative, then α1 > 0.  DDIVYj equals 4⋅[DIVAMT of current quarter –
DIVAMT of previous quarter]/P, where DIVAMT is the dollar quarterly dividend per 
share (adjusted for stock dividends and splits) and P is the price at the end of the month 
that precedes the month when the dividend is announced.5    
The other variables in the regression are included as controls.  SIZEN is the firm’s 
stock value (in logarithm) at the last month prior to the dividend announcement month, 
                                                 
5 We eliminate 6 cases where |DDIVY| > 0.20 (for example, an increase in dividend yield from 1% to 21%). 
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normalized by the S&P 500 index (base: July 1962).6 SIZENj should have negative 
coefficient for a number of reasons. First, large firms usually receive more attention by 
analysts and investors, which reduces the incremental information about the firm 
provided by the dividend change (Christensen and Prabhala (1995)).  Firm’s size is also 
positively correlated with the firm’s age, which means that investors have more 
information about the firm.  Also, firm’s size and stock liquidity are positively correlated.  
If firms pay dividends to allow investors satisfy their liquidity needs without incurring 
transactions costs (Benarjee, Gatchev and Spindt (2003)), dividend increases are more 
welcome by investors in illiquid stocks, implying again a negative relationship between 
CAR and SIZEN.  LTYLD is the long-term dividend yield, the sum of DIVAMT paid over 
a 12-month period ending in the month prior to the dividend announcement month, 
divided by the average end-of-month price during the 3-month period preceding the 12-
month period.  This ratio is then deflated by (1 + return on the S&P 500 index) for the 
same 12-month period to adjust for market-wide stock price movements (see Christensen 
and Prabhala, 1995).  LTYLDj captures the effects of factors that affect the level of the 
firm’s dividend yield (discussed in detail below). The coefficient of LTYLDj should be 
positive because dividend changes are more informative in high dividend-paying firms 
which have lower growth prospects, and because the surprise of dividend increase in such 
firms is greater.  We index by j the dividend change event; the variables are measured 
before the event and are hence known to investors by the time of the announcement.7  
                                                 
6 Since SIZE changes (generally increases) over time, its coefficients in the cross-section regressions will 
vary over time. The normalization adjusts for that.  
7 We also estimate model (3) replacing DDIVYj by the dividend surprise obtained from a Probit model of 
dividend changes as a function of some explanatory variable, as proposed by Christensen and Prabhala 
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INSERT FIGURE 2 
Model (3) is estimated cross-sectionally for each year8 y to obtain the dividend 
response coefficient α1y.  The model is estimated only for dividend increases, since in 
some years there are too few dividend decrease announcements.  The annual estimated 
coefficients are plotted in Figure 2, together with their five-year moving average.  Figure 
2 shows a decline in the five-year moving average of α1y since the early 1980s, consistent 
with the pattern of disappearing dividends depicted by Fama and French (2001).   
We formally test the trend of α1y by regressing it on y (see Table 1). The 
coefficient is negative and significant, that is, the dividend response coefficient generally 
declines over time.  For dividend decrease announcements, we estimate the dividend 
response coefficient in a pooled time-series and cross-section model for the entire period. 
The results are qualitatively similar: the dividend response coefficient declines over time. 
Next, we use the estimated coefficients α1y to examine the effects of some 
explanations for the declining information content of dividends. We estimating the model 
(4) α1y  = a0 + a1 Xy         
The variable Xy is one of the following: 
(a)  TAXy = [weighted tax rate on dividend – weighted tax rate on capital gains]. The data 
source is the NBER Taxsim web site (calculated by Daniel Feenberg; data are missing for 
1963 and 1965, which are excluded).  The decline in TAX since the 1960s may explain 
the decline in α1y, since this tax differential makes dividend signaling effective (see 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1995) and Prabhala (1997). The results are qualitatively similar to those reported for DDIVYj: the 
coefficient α1, which measures the effect of dividend surprise on CAR, declines over time.   
8 Year 1962 is deleted because of too few dividend increase observations. CRSP daily files begin in July.  
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Bernheim and Wantz, 1995).9   However, Baker and Wurgler (2004) argue that the 
decline in TAXy should have increased the propensity of firms to pay dividends whereas 
in reality dividends declined. 
(b) ILLIQy measures illiquidity (in logarithms), the average over stocks and over the days 
of the year of stocks’ daily ratio of absolute return to dollar volume.10 ILLIQy is known to 
decline over time (Amihud, 2002).  Benarjee, Gatchev and Spindt (2003) show that 
improved market liquidity reduces the propensity of firms to pay dividends since the cash 
flow provided by dividends help investors avoid incurring illiquidity costs.  Therefore, 
the desirability of dividends is an increasing function of illiquidity.  
(c)  DNDSy is the valuation spread between dividend- and non-dividend-paying firms, 
which proxies for investors’ demand for dividends. Baker and Wurgler (2004) propose 
that dividend payment by firms cater to investors’ demand for dividends, hence it should 
increase when DNDSy rises. 
(d)  ROAy is the average ratio of EBITDA to total assets for all dividend-paying firms in 
the year.  Dividend increases are more likely if ROA is higher. 
(e)  REPy, stock repurchase, the dollar amount of equity purchases divided by the 
beginning-of-year market value of equity, averaged over all dividend-paying firms in the 
year (see Grinstein and Michaely (2004); this series begins in 1971). The effect of REPy 
may be negative if it provides information about the firm that substitutes that of 
                                                 
9 However, Amihud and Murgia (1997) find that higher tax on dividends is not necessary to make dividend 
news affect stock prices. 
10 See Amihud (2002). Hasbrouck (2004) shows that this measure is highly correlated with the price impact 
cost (Kyle’s λ) estimated from transaction-by-transaction microstructure data. The measure is used in an 
asset pricing model by Acharya and Pedersen (2004). 
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dividends, or it may be positive if repurchases are substitutes for dividend increases and 
then, when dividend is increases, it is more of a surprise.  
(f)  AGEy is the average age (in log years) of all dividend paying firms obtained from the 
CRSP database.  Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan’s (2002) “maturity hypothesis” 
suggests that firms’ age is an important determinant of dividend policy. Since the average 
age of firms might have declined over time, it might explain the decline in dividends.  
(g)  INSTy is institutional ownership of stocks (source: Federal Reserve Bank). By our 
hypothesis, which we test cross-sectionally in Section III, higher institutional ownership 
leads to a decline in the stock price reaction to dividend news. 
(h)  y is the year, which enables to tests the trend in α1y. 
INSERT TABLE 1 
The estimation results of model (4) are mostly consistent with expectations in 
terms of the signs of the coefficients although they are not all statistically significant.  
The coefficients of TAX, ILLIQ, DNDS and ROA are positive while the coefficients of 
REP, AGE, INST and y are negative.  When all variables are included in the equation, 
none is significant. The R2 is 47% and the F-test indicates that jointly, these variables 
contribute significantly to the explanation of α1y.  This is because of the problem of 
colinearity, since most of these variables are trending over time.  For example, 
Corr(INSTy, y) = 0.88, Corr(REPy, y) = 0.85 and Corr(INSTy, AGEy) = 0.83.  Because any 
trending variable, such as y, is correlated with α1y, we proceed to do cross-sectional 
analysis.  Then, market-wide trending variables that are common to all firms, such as 
TAX, DNDS and y, do not play a role. 
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In summary, our evidence shows that the extent of new information revealed by 
dividend announcements has been declining over time.  In the next section, we test our 
proposed explanation across stocks. 
 
 
III.   Institutional investors and price reaction to dividend announcements 
 We propose that the declining stock price reaction to dividend news is due to the 
increase over time in the stockholdings of institutional investors, which are more 
informed than retail investors.  Institutional investors are more informed because they 
have the incentive and the ability to expend more resources on gathering and processing 
information about companies. Large holdings of stocks produce larger benefits from a 
given amount of information and thus provide incentives to obtain information.  
Institutional investors also enjoy economies of scale and professional expertise, which 
lower their marginal cost in acquiring and processing information, and they have greater 
financial resources which can be employed to acquire information.   
There is evidence that institutional investors’ trades reflect more information 
relative to all trades in the market (Chakravarty, 2001) and stocks with high institutional 
holdings have greater information-based trading (Dennis and Weston, 2001).  Jiambalvo, 
Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2002) find that stock prices of firms with higher 
institutional holdings better reflect information about future earnings.  This is consistent 
with the results for such firms of Alangar, Bathala and Rao (1999) on lower volatility 
around dividend announcements and of Bartov, Radhakrishnan and Krinski (2000) on 
less information in their earnings announcements.  Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) find 
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that firms that expand their disclosure attract institutional investments,11 which suggests 
that more information is available about firms with large institutional holdings.  Chen, 
Jagedeesh and Wermer (2000) find that stocks purchased by mutual funds outperform 
stocks that they sell, and Barber, Lee, Liu and Odean (2004) find that institutional 
investors gain from trade while individual investors lose, suggesting that institutional 
investors are more informed.  
 Since the more-informed institutional investors use their information in trading 
stocks, then by the time a dividend change is announced, part of the information that it 
conveys about the firm’s value is already incorporated in the stock price. Thus the price 
reaction to this news is smaller in firms with high institutional holdings.   This leads to 
our proposition that the well-known increase over time in institutional holdings can 
explain in part our evidence on the decline over time in the stock price reaction to 
dividend news, and consequently the evidence of Fama and French (2001) on the 
disappearing dividends.  However, the congruence of the two phenomena over time – a 
rise in institutional holdings and a decline in stock price reaction to dividends – does not 
establish a causal relationship. We therefore examine this relationship by a cross-
sectional analysis, testing the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the institutional ownership, the smaller the reaction of stock 
prices to dividend news, where stock price reaction is measured by abnormal returns and 
by the dividend response coefficient. 
                                                 
11 Chidambaran and John (2001) show that large shareholders induce having managerial compensation 
contracts that provide incentives for greater voluntary disclosure of information. 
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Hypothesis 2: Institutional investors increase their holdings in companies which 
subsequently announce increase in dividend.  Therefore, by the time the dividend 
increases are announced, stock prices reflect the information that the institutional 
investors have had, and therefore the stock price reaction to the dividend news is smaller. 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with greater institutional holdings are less likely to raise dividends. 
This is because companies see then a lesser need to convey information by costly 
signaling through dividends.   
 
A.  Data and variable definitions  
 The data on institutional holdings of stocks are based on the quarterly reports in 
Form 13F to the SEC.12 All common stock positions greater than 10,000 shares or 
$300,000 must be disclosed. Our data source is CDA/Spectrum (as provided by Thomson 
Financial), based on the Disclosure Database.13  Institutional investors include banks, 
insurance companies, investment companies (mutual funds), investment advisors,14 
pension funds and university endowment funds.  Our data are from the second quarter of 
1980 through the third quarter of 1998, except quarters 4Q1993, 1Q1994 and 2Q1994, for 
which data are missing, a total of 71 quarters. 
                                                 
12 A 1978 amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 requires all institutions with more than 
$100 million of securities under discretionary management to report their holdings to the SEC. 
13 In a comparative study of the reliability of ownership data from several databases, Anderson and Lee 
(1996) conclude that the ownership data on Disclosure Database ranks above its peers. 
14 Includes investment managers (usually in brokerage firms) holding less than 50% of their assets in 
mutual funds. See Gompers and Metrick (2001) for details. 
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 To be included in the sample, a dividend change announcement must satisfy the 
conditions specified in section II.A and the stock must have valid institutional holding 
data.  These criteria result in a sample of 4,910 dividend increase announcements and 448 
dividend decreases.  We henceforth analyze dividend increases because the sample of 
dividend decreases is too small in some periods for the tests that we conduct. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
Institutional holdings, INSTj, is the proportion of the firm’s outstanding shares 
owned by institutional investors at the end of the quarter before the quarter when the 
dividend announcement j is made.  Table 2 presents the means and medians of INSTj over 
1980-1998.  There is a clear trend of increase over time. The mean INSTj almost doubles 
from 0.2901 in 1980 to 0.5351 in 1998, with a similar rise in the median. INSTj  is larger 
for stocks with greater market capitalization: Corr(INSTj ,SIZENj) = 0.44 (this is the 
average over all quarters of the correlation in each quarter).  The positive correlation 
suggests that institutions prefer investing in large-size stocks that are more liquid and 
thus enable trading of large quantities of shares with little price impact.  And, larger 
holdings are more attractive to institutions due to economies of scale in the production of 
information.  In the estimation models that follow, we control for firm size.  
 
B.  The effect of institutional holding on price reaction to dividend announcements 
 Our Hypothesis 1 is that larger institutional holdings reduce the positive response 
of stock prices to dividend increase announcements.  This is demonstrated in the pattern 
of CAR in Figure 3.  In each quarter, we allocate the stocks with dividend increase 
announcements into three equal portfolios by their institutional holdings – low, medium 
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and high INST – and then calculate the average CAR over days –11 to +1 for each 
portfolio.  Figure 3 shows that the CAR around dividend increase announcements is 
highest for stocks with low institutional holdings and lowest for stocks with high 
institutional holdings. The ratio of the highest to the lowest CAR is about 4 to 1. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
Next, we formally test the effect of INST on CAR, controlling for other stock 
characteristics, employing two estimation methods: pooled regression and the Fama-
Macbeth method by which we estimated the model across stocks for each year y, y = 
1980, … 1998, and then average the 19 annual coefficients across years.  We present the 
weighted average of the 19 coefficients, the weights being the squared coefficient 
standard errors obtained from the annual cross-sectional regression. This is because the 
coefficient variances may differ across years due to variations in the annual number of 
observations (they vary between 130 and 373) and differences in the return variance.  
The pooled time-series and cross-section regression model is 
(5-1) CARj = a0 + a1DDIVYj + a2INSTj + a3SP500j + a4LTYLDj + a5SIZENj + a6AGEj  
       + a7LTVOLj + a8ILLIQj+ a9ROAj + a10REPj + ∑
=
56
1m
a11mINDmj +∑
=
70
1n
a12nQTRnj + ej .  
The Fama-Macbeth regressions for each year y are 
(5-2) CARjy = a0y + a1yDDIVYjy + a2yINSTjy + a3ySP500jy + a4yLTYLDjy+ a5ySIZENjy  
  + a6yAGEjy + a7yLTVOLjy + a8yILLIQjy + a9yROAjy + a10yREPjy + ∑
=
12
1m
a11myINDmjy + ejy .  
INSTj is the proportion of institutional holdings at the end of the quarter before the 
dividend increase announcement is made, and SP500j is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the stock is included in the S&P 500 index and 0 otherwise.   
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By Hypothesis 1, a2 < 0, i.e., larger institutional holdings attenuate the generally 
positive CAR which correspond to dividend increase announcements. Ideally, we would 
include in INSTj only active institutional investments where information is gathered and 
generated, and exclude the passive ones, such as index investments. Since this is 
infeasible, we include in the model the dummy variable SP500j,15 and expect to obtain 
a3 > 0: institutional holdings in S&P500 stocks is partially passive and thus should have a 
less-negative effect on CAR. 
Model (5) includes a number of control variables. Long-term dividend yields, 
LTYLDj (the dividend yield over the 12 months before the dividend announcement), 
largely summarizes factors that affect the firm’s dividend policy.   As discussed earlier, 
we expect a4 > 0.  SIZENj is the firm’s size (deflated by the S&P 500 index, base is 
1962), in logarithm.  We expect a5 < 0 for a number of reasons. First, large firms receive 
more attention by analysts and investors and therefore the dividend news is less of a 
surprise. Also, since SIZENj and INSTj are positively correlated, inclusion of SIZENj 
prevents confounding of the effect of size with that of institutional holdings.  SIZENj is 
also correlated with the firm’s maturity, which positively affects dividend yield (Grullon 
et al. (2002)).  Maturity is directly measured by AGEj, the number of months the stock 
exists on CRSP, in logarithm.  Since mature firms are likely to pay higher dividends, a 
dividend increase should be regarded as less of a surprise, implying a5 < 0 and a6 < 0.  
Finally, SIZENj is positively correlated with stock liquidity, which affects dividend policy 
                                                 
15 We also examine an alternative specification of model (5) where the SP500j is replaced by INSTj·SP500j.  
The coefficient of this variable should be positive, i.e., in a stock that is included in the S&P 500 index, the 
effect of INSTj on CARj should be less negative. These are indeed the results that we obtain. 
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since dividends provide liquidity for investors with liquidity needs (Banerjee, Gatchev 
and Spindt (2003)).  Thus, dividends are more desirable in less liquid stocks, implying 
a5 < 0.  The effect of illiquidity is also tested by ILLIQj, the daily ratio of absolute return 
to total dollar volume averaged over the pre-announcement period (days -252 to -2).  If 
dividends are more valuable in illiquid firms, we expect a8 > 0.  The model also includes 
LTVOLj, long term volatility, the standard deviation of monthly stock returns in the 24 
months before the month of the dividend increase announcement.  If dividend news is 
more informative in firms with larger information asymmetry, we expect a7 > 0.  Finally, 
we include in the model ROAj, the return on assets (EBITDA/total assets) which affects 
the firm’s propensity to pay dividend, and REPj, stock repurchase (equity 
repurchase/market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year), both for the year before the 
dividend increase announcement.  High ROAj may generate expectations of dividend 
increase and thus when the increase is announced, its effect on price is smaller, a9 < 0.  
REPj is found by Grinstein and Michaely (2004) to be related to INSTj. Its effect on CARj 
is unclear. If stock repurchases provide information that reduces the information content 
of dividends, a10 < 0.  But if stock repurchase are considered substitutes for dividend 
increases, we expect a10 > 0, i.e., a greater surprise when dividend is increased. 
The model includes time dummy variables: QTRnj equals 1 if event j is in quarter 
n and zero otherwise. This controls for possible variations over time in average CAR due 
to time-related factors (e.g., taxes and investors’ sentiment).  INDmj is an industry dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the firm that made announcement j is in industry m, using two-
digit SIC, and zero otherwise; our data include 57 industries in the pooled regressions and 
13 major industry groups (following Lo and Wang (2001)) in the Fama-Macbeth 
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regressions, which are done annually on a smaller number of observations. The sample 
consists of 4,507 cases that satisfy the data requirements.  
The model is estimated for both CARj (days 0 to +1) and CAR13j (days –11 to +1) 
in two versions.  The reduced model includes only variables whose coefficients are 
significant for CARj and CAR13j, and the full model includes all variables.  
INSERT TABLE 3 
Hypothesis 1 is strongly supported by the results, presented in Table 3, Panel A.  
The coefficient of INSTj, a2, is negative and significant for both CAR and CAR13, for 
both models and for both estimation methods. Also, the coefficient of SP500j has the 
opposite sign, as expected.  The other variables in the reduced model have the expected 
coefficients. In the full model, the coefficients of the added variables are insignificantly 
different from zero for the model with CARj.  The effect of SIZENj is insignificant for 
CAR13j, but then ILLIQj has a more significant effect. LTVOLj has the expected positive 
effect but it is insignificant for CARj. 
As a robustness check on the effect of institutional holdings, INSTj is replaced by 
an ordinal measure of institutional holdings, INSTORDj, which is insensitive to outliers 
and clustering of values of INSTj.  In each quarter, we rank stocks with dividend increase 
announcements by their institutional holdings and divide them into 10 groups. Then, 
INSTORDj = 1, 2, …, 10, where 10 is the group with the highest INSTj.  The results are 
qualitatively similar. For example, when INSTORDj replaces INSTj in the reduced-model 
version of (5-1),  a2 = –0.0004 (t = 2.20) for CAR and a2 = −0.0013 (t = 3.17) for CAR13.  
The signs and statistical significance of the other variables remain unchanged. 
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In another robustness check, we examine the effect of a possible endogeneity of 
institutional holdings, re-estimating model (5) by the instrumental variables method. The 
instrumental variables that may affect the level of institutional holdings are LTYLD (to 
account for a possible effect of dividend policy on INST), LTVOL, SIZEN, SP500, PRC 
(stock price at the end of the month before the dividend announcement, in logarithm), 
AGE, momentum (return over the past 3 months), market-to-book ratio and stock 
turnover.  We obtain that in the reduced-model version of (5-1), a2 = –0.029 (t = 3.67) for 
CAR and a2 = −0.095 (t = 5.76) for CAR13, consistent with our hypothesis. 
 The second test of Hypothesis 1 examines the effect of institutional holdings on 
the dividend response coefficient, which measures the price impact of the magnitude of 
dividend increases. We estimate the following pooled regression: 
(6-1) CARj = b0 + b1DDIVYj + b2DDIVYj⋅INSTj + b3DDIVYj⋅SP500j a4LTYLDj  
+ b5SIZENj + b6AGEj + b7LTVOLj + b8ILLIQj+ b9ROAj + b10REPj  
+ ∑
=
56
1m
b11mINDmj +∑
=
70
1n
b12nQTRnj + ej .      
The corresponding Fama-Macbeth regressions for each year y are 
(6-2) CARjy = b0y + b1yDDIVYjy + b2yDDIVYjy⋅INSTjy + b3yDDIVYjy⋅SP500jy 
+ b4yLTYLDjy + b5ySIZENjy + b6yAGEjy + b7yLTVOLjy + b8yILLIQjy  
+ b9yROAjy + b10yREPjy + ∑
=
12
1m
b11myINDmjy + ejy,                
By Hypothesis 1, institutional holdings should reduce the dividend response 
coefficient, i.e., b2 < 0.  And, since some institutional holdings of S&P 500 stocks are 
passive, we expect b3 > 0. 
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The estimation results of model (6), presented in Table 3, Panel B, again support 
Hypothesis 1 in all models: b2 is negative and significant.  Also, b3 is positive and 
significant.  Again, as a robustness check, we re-estimate model (6-1) replacing INSTj by 
the ordinal variable INSTORDj = 1, 2, …10.  Then, b2 = −0.107 (t = 2.72) for CAR and 
b2 = −0.220 (t = 2.71) for CAR13 in the reduced version of model (6-1). 
As another robustness check, we control for analysts coverage of firms that 
announce dividend increases, since such coverage also affects the information available 
to investors about the stock.  We add to model (6-1) DDIVYj⋅ANALYSTSj, where 
ANALYSTSj is the number of analysts’ estimates in the consensus earnings estimate prior 
to the announcement of dividend change (in logarithms; the data source is I/B/E/S).  The 
sample size is then reduced by 26% to 3377 events.  The estimated coefficient of 
DDIVYj⋅ANALYSTSj is 0.26 (t = 1.94).  Importantly, the coefficient of DDIVYj⋅INSTj 
remains negative, −2.86, with t = 3.90, highly significant. 
 
C. Trading by institutional investors around dividend increase announcements 
 Institutional investors with favorable information about a firm may buy its stock 
well before this information becomes public through a dividend increase announcement 
by the firm.  Therefore, this information will have been incorporated in the stock price by 
the time the dividend increase is announced, and consequently the price reaction to the 
news will be smaller, as documented in Section II.  Hypothesis 2 tests whether such a 
pattern of trading exists. We expect that institutional investors increase their holdings in a 
firm before it announces a dividend increase, and after the information becomes public 
their acquisition of the firm’s stock subsides or even reversed (i.e., they sell the stock). 
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We do an event study-type analysis of changes in institutional holdings around the 
quarter when the dividend increase in announced.  Excess change in institutional holdings 
is measured by E∆INSTj = ∆INSTj – ∆INSTm, where ∆INSTj is the quarterly change in 
INSTj and ∆INSTm is the quarterly change in INST for all firms for which data are 
available in the quarter.  Because of positive skewness, we do the transformation log(1+ 
E∆INSTj), which we still call E∆INSTj.  We expect that E∆INSTj > 0 in quarters q =  –2 
and q = –1, while in quarter q = +1 the rise in INSTj should disappear or INSTj should 
even decline if institutions scale back their holdings after they no longer have information 
advantage.  Then, E∆INSTj ≤ 0.  At the end of q = 0, the quarter when the dividend 
increase is announced, E∆INSTj should be small or zero. 
INSERT TABLE 4 
The results in Table 4 are consistent with Hypothesis 2.16  In column (a), the 
means of E∆INSTj  are positive and highly significant in the two quarters before the 
dividend increase announcement, whereas mean E∆INSTj is zero in q = +1.  In q = 0, 
E∆INSTj is positive but smaller than in the previous quarter.  By the tests in column (b), 
the mean E∆INSTj after the dividend announcement (q = +1) is significantly smaller than 
the mean E∆INSTj before the announcement (q = –2 and in particular q = –1), while the 
difference from quarter q = 0 is marginally insignificant.  This is consistent with our 
hypothesis: institutions buy aggressively in the quarters before the dividend increase 
announcement but not afterwards.   
                                                 
16 The number of cases in this test rises, between 4590 and 4746, because we are not constrained by data 
availability on other variables; but other data limitations constrain the analysis to 68-70 quarters. 
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Column (c) presents the means of E∆INSTj weighted by INSTj0, the institutional 
holdings at the end of q = 0.  We expect that our hypothesis will be more pronounced in 
firms with high institutional holdings, about which more information is generated.  
Indeed, the results in Table 3 have shown that in firms with larger INSTj, less new 
information is generated by dividend increase announcements and consequently the price 
increase is smaller.  The results in column (c) show that while the (weighted) mean of 
E∆INSTj is positive and highly significant in quarters q = –2 and q = –1, it is practically 
zero in q = 0 and it turns slightly negative in q = +1 which follows the announcement. 
Column (d) presents test results of the null hypotheses that the proportion of firms 
with E∆INSTj > 0 is not different from 0.50, a chance result, against the alternative 
hypothesis that the proportion is greater than 0.50.  We obtain that the null hypothesis is 
rejected for quarters q = –2, q = –1 and q = 0, but not for quarter q = +1.  The result is 
particularly strong for quarter q = –1. That is, INSTj rises well before the dividend 
increase is announced but afterwards there is no systematic excess change in INSTj. 
Finally, we present in columns (e) and (f) the mean of the quarters’ mean 
E∆INSTj.  We obtain again that while E∆INSTj is large and significant particularly in 
quarter q = –1, it is practically zero in quarter q = +1.  This pattern is strongly 
pronounced for the INSTj0-weighted mean of E∆INSTj which is positive and significant 
for both q = –2 and q = –1 and practically zero for quarters q = 0 and q = +1. 
We also estimate in a regression model for each quarter how ∆INSTj changes as a 
function of INSTj0, controlling for the effects of SP500j, SIZENj, LTYLDj and LTVOLj as 
well as for time variation of mean ∆INSTj (using quarter dummies) and for industries.  
We assume that in firms with larger INSTj0 the institutional trading activity is more 
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pronounced.  The results17 are as follows. During quarters q = –2 and q = –1, the 
coefficient of ∆INSTj on INSTj0 is positive and significant, meaning that in such firms 
there is more active buying of stocks before the dividend increase announcements.  In 
quarters q = 0 and q = +1, the coefficient is negative and significant, that is, after the 
information about the firm becomes public, institutional holdings are scaled back more in 
firms with larger INSTj0. 
The results are thus consistent with our Hypothesis 2: institutional investors, 
which are better informed about well-performing firms before these firms announce 
dividend increases, use their information to trade well before the news become public.  
Because of their early buying, by the time that the dividend increase is announced, part of 
the favorable information is already incorporated in the stock price.  This explains the 
results that the price reaction (CAR) to this information is smaller (Section III.C). 
 
D. The effect of institutional holdings on the firms’ dividend decisions 
We now turn to Hypothesis 3. If larger institutional holdings reduce the positive 
price impact of dividend increase announcements, then given that dividends are costly, 
firms with high institutional holdings should be less likely to raise dividends.  We test this 
hypothesis by examining the effect of institutional holdings on the likelihood of dividend 
increases. We estimate the following ordered probit model (following Christensen and 
Prabhala (1995)): 
                                                 
17 The results are available upon request. 
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(7-1) Lj = θ0 + θ1INSTj +θ2SP500j + θ3LTYLDj + θ4DIFYLDj + θ5SIZENj + θ6PRCj   
          + θ7LTVOLj  +∑
=
56
1m
θ8mINDmj +∑
=
70
1n
θ9nQTRnj +  ej .   
The corresponding annual Fama-Macbeth regression model (7-2) has 13 (aggregated) 
industry dummy variables instead of 56 and does not include the quarterly dummy 
variables.  Lj equals +1, 0 or –1 if the dividend announcement j is an increase, no change 
or decrease (respectively) compared to the dividend in the previous quarter. INSTj is the 
institutional holdings in the quarter before the dividend announcement.  DIFYLDj = 
STYLDj – LTYLDj is the difference between the short term and the long term dividend 
yield.18  STYLD is the most recent quarterly dividend divided by the stock price at the end 
of the month prior to the dividend announcement, multiplied by four (annualized).  PRCj 
is the stock price (in logarithm) at the end of the quarter before the dividend 
announcement.  Notably, this estimation uses all dividend announcements for which data 
on INSTj are available, including those with no change in dividends, which are by far the 
great majority of all dividend announcements. 
INSERT TABLE 5 
By Hypothesis 3 we expect θ1 < 0.  The results, presented in Table 5, support our 
hypothesis: the coefficient of INSTj is negative and significant.  That is, higher 
institutional holdings reduce the probability of subsequent dividend increases, which 
means that the dividend decision of firms is affected in part by the identity of their 
investors.  This finding is consistent with our main hypothesis in this study: the 
                                                 
18 We eliminate 9 announcements, 0.02% of the sample, with DIFYLD > 20%. 
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phenomenon of disappearing dividends in the U.S. is tied to the increase in institutional 
holdings of stocks. 
 
E.  Institutional holdings and stock price reaction to dividend surprises 
 It could be argued that the relationship between CARj and INSTj (measured in the 
quarter before the dividend is announced) documented in section III.B., is tainted by our 
findings in section III.D. that the likelihood of dividend changes is affected in part by 
INSTj.  A similar problem was considered by Christensen and Prabhala (1995) where a 
structural variable may affect both the likelihood of a dividend increase and the price 
reaction to the surprise about the dividend increase.  We therefore repeat our estimations 
of the effect of INSTj on CARj after having controlled for the effect of INSTj on the 
dividend surprise.  DIVSURPj is obtained from the ordered probit model (7) as the 
expectation of the structural residual conditional on the event (see Christensen and 
Prabhala, 1995.  We analyze the events of dividend increases and estimate the following 
models, which are similar to models (5) and (6), with DIVSURPj replacing DDIVYj: 
(8-1) CARj = γ0 + γ1DIVSURPj + γ2INSTj + γ3SP500j + γ4SIZENj + γ5LTYLDj  
+ ∑
=
56
1m
γ6mINDmj +∑
=
70
1n
γ7nQTRnj + ej .     
 
(9-1) CARj = δ0 + δ1DIVSURPj + δ2DIVSURPj⋅INSTj + δ3DIVSURPj⋅SP500j  
+ δ4SIZENj + δ5LTYLDj +∑
=
56
1m
δ6mINDmj +∑
=
70
1n
δ7nQTRnj + ej .  
The corresponding annual Fama-Macbeth models, (8-2) and (9-2), do not include 
quarterly dummies and use13 dummy variables for the aggregated industrial groups.   
INSERT TABLE 6 
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 Hypothesis 1, that implies γ2 < 0 and δ2 < 0, is strongly supported by the results in 
Table 6.  Both γ2 and δ2 are negative and highly significant in all models.  The greater the 
institutional holdings, the smaller is the information in reaction to dividend increase 
announcements. The coefficient of SP500j has the opposite sign of that of INSTj, as 
expected, although it is not always significant. 
 Most of our results on the effects of institutional holdings accommodate an 
alternative explanation. Institutions may have superior ability to monitor firms and thus 
reduce agency costs.  Dividends are also suggested to have a monitoring role by reducing 
free cash flows and provide subjecting managers to screening by the market when they 
need to raise capital (Easterbrook, 1984). If monitoring by institutions substitutes for 
monitoring by dividends, we should obtain the results that are documented above: a 
decline in the stock price reaction to dividend increase announcements, and a decline in 
the propensity of firms to raise dividends.  However, some of our results pertain only to 
the explanation associated with the information content of dividends and the superior 
information possessed by institutional investors:  CAR for dividend decrease 
announcements (which convey information but have no monitoring implications) also 
show a decline over time, and we show that institutions trade on their information that is 
reflected in subsequent dividend increase announcements.  
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
In this paper we propose the following. 
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(1) The “disappearing dividend” phenomenon is partly due to a decline in the information 
content of dividend news – dividend increases and decreases.  If dividends provide 
investors with less information about the firm’s value, then given that they are costly, 
firms may refrain from initiating them or from raising them and may even reduce 
them. 
(2) Dividend announcements are becoming less informative due to the increase in 
stockholdings by institutional investors that are more sophisticated and informed than 
average individual investors.  Thus, by the time the dividend news is announced, the 
information that it is intended to convey is already incorporated in the stock price. 
Consequently, the disappearing dividends are partly a result of the increase in 
institutional holdings. 
We test each of the two hypotheses in a number of ways and the results are 
consistent with our hypotheses.  We observe a strong trend of decline in stock price 
reaction to dividend change announcements since the late 1970s that coincides with the 
pattern of decline in dividends that also began at that time.   
In a cross-sectional analysis we find that the price reaction to dividend news is 
weaker in stocks with high institutional holdings.  We also observe that institutional 
investors increase their holdings in firms that subsequently raise dividends even two 
quarters before the announcement but stop doing that after the dividend announcement, 
especially in firms with large institutional holdings. And finally, firms with high 
institutional holdings are less likely to raise their dividends. Altogether, our analysis 
shows that the disappearance of dividends reflects the declining role of dividends as a 
means to convey information, which is a result of the increase in institutional holdings. 
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Table 1 
Regressions of α1y on annual time series, 1963-2000 
 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
Const. 0.765 
(3.53) 
1.838 
(9.16) 
1.323 
(10.17 
0.593 
(1.04) 
1.961 
(8.85) 
7.199 
(2.29) 
2.372 
(6.53) 
73.13 
(3.66) 
TAX 0.041 
(3.46) 
       
ILLIQ  0.380 
(3.28) 
      
DNDS   0.009 
(1.92) 
     
ROA    0.013 
(1.15) 
    
REP     -66.10 
(3.48) 
   
AGE      -1.977 
(1.87) 
  
INST       -0.030 
(2.91) 
 
y        -0.036 
(3.60) 
R2 0.24 0.20 0.04 0.03 0.30 0.09 0.19 0.31 
DW 1.66 1.79 1.55 1.50 1.66 1.59 1.71 2.03 
 
 
The dependent variable α1y is the dividend response coefficient for year y, obtained by 
regressing CARjy on the dividend increase DDIVYjy across firms in year y. TAXy is the 
difference between the tax rates on dividends and on capital gains. ILLIQy is market 
illiquidity (in logarithm), the ratio of daily absolute return to dollar volume in year y 
(averaged over all days and across all stocks; Amihud (2002)). DNDSy is the spread 
between the Q values of dividend- and non-dividend-paying stocks (Baker and Wurgler 
(2004)). ROAy is the average ROA in year y for dividend-paying firms. REPy, the extent 
of stock repurchase, is the proportion the dollar amount of equity purchase out of 
beginning-of-year market value of equity (the series begins in 1971).  AGEy is the age (in 
log years) of dividend paying firms in year y. INST is the average institutional holdings in 
year y.  Data on TAX are missing for 1963 and 1965. Data on REP begin in 1971.  
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Table 2 
Statistics on institutional holdings over time 
 
 
 
INST 
Year 
Number of 
cases Mean Median 
1980 283 0.2901 0.2946 
1981 373 0.3150 0.3320 
1982 265 0.3215 0.3366 
1983 259 0.3403 0.3575 
1984 335 0.3567 0.3713 
1985 264 0.3918 0.4025 
1986 198 0.4264 0.4350 
1987 253 0.4365 0.4514 
1988 326 0.4601 0.4807 
1989 315 0.4603 0.4754 
1990 261 0.4836 0.5006 
1991 203 0.4825 0.4909 
1992 228 0.4823 0.5091 
1993 195 0.4885 0.5296 
1994 156 0.4983 0.5063 
1995 323 0.5104 0.5453 
1996 309 0.4934 0.5075 
1997 231 0.5131 0.5264 
1998 130 0.5351 0.5447 
 
The table presents statistics on INST, the proportion of the firm’s stock held by 
institutional investors.  The observations are for firms that announce dividend increase. 
The variable INST is for the end of the quarter when dividend increase is announced. 
Data are missing for three quarters, 4Q1993-2Q1994. The averages for the respective 
years are over the quarters for which data are available. 
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Table 3 
The effect of institutional holdings on stock price reaction to dividend increases 
 
 
Panel A: Models (5-1) and (5-2). 
 
Pooled regressions 
 
Fama-Macbeth regressions 
 
 
 
Variable CAR CAR13 CAR CAR13 
 
CAR 
 
CAR13 CAR CAR13 
a1 
DDIVYj 
1.03 
(7.60) 
1.76 
(6.27) 
0.98 
(7.15) 
1.64 
(5.75) 
1.10 
(4.13) 
1.65 
(4.40) 
1.26 
(3.59) 
2.41 
(3.96) 
a2 
INSTj 
-0.007 
(2.28) 
-0.019 
(3.06) 
-0.006 
(1.93) 
-0.016 
(2.52) 
-0.007 
(2.75) 
-0.018 
(3.24) 
-0.005 
(2.00) 
-0.013 
(2.42) 
a3 
SP500j  
0.003 
(2.15) 
0.007 
(2.46) 
0.003 
(2.02) 
0.006 
(2.07) 
0.002 
(1.68) 
0.005 
(1.99) 
0.002 
(1.26) 
0.001 
(0.17) 
a4 
SIZENj  
-0.001 
(3.38) 
-0.003 
(3.15) 
-0.001 
(2.60) 
-0.002 
(1.69) 
-0.001 
(2.54) 
-0.001 
(2.45) 
-0.001 
(2.11) 
0.000 
(0.12) 
a5 
LTYLDj  
0.12 
(3.42) 
0.29 
(3.98) 
0.14 
(3.72) 
0.32 
(4.14) 
0.12 
(4.85) 
0.16 
(1.81) 
0.143 
(4.22) 
0.18 
(2.11) 
a6 
Agej    
-0.0001 
(0.18) 
-0.0002 
(0.16) 
  0.001 
(0.92) 
0.002 
(1.40) 
a7 
LTVOLj   
0.003 
(1.57) 
0.008 
(2.03) 
  0.004 
(1.56) 
0.009 
(1.44) 
a8 
ILLIQj   
0.002 
(0.60) 
0.010 
(1.87) 
  0.011 
(1.76) 
0.027 
(1.89) 
a9 
ROAj 
  0.005 (0.78) 
-0.017 
(1.29)   
0.004 
(0.76) 
-0.011 
(0.70) 
a10 
REPj 
  0.008 (0.66) 
-0.020 
(0.81)   
0.013 
(0.72) 
0.011 
(0.25) 
Adjusted 
R2 7.2% 7.2% 7.3% 7.4% 11.76% 9.60% 14.36% 13.03% 
No. Obs 4507 4507 4237 4237 4507 4507 4237 4237 
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 Panel B: Models (6-1) and (6-2) 
Pooled regressions 
 
Fama-Macbeth regressions 
 
 
 
Variable CAR CAR13 CAR 
 
CAR13 
 
CAR CAR13 CAR CAR13 
b1 
DDIVYj 
1.41 
(7.41) 
2.49 
(6.34) 
1.33 
(6.81) 
2.24 
(5.53) 
1.62 
(4.14) 
2.62 
(4.53) 
1.69 
(3.05) 
3.39 
(4.07) 
b2 
DDIVYj⋅ 
INSTj 
-1.79 
(3.23) 
-3.41 
(2.98) 
-1.67 
(2.96) 
-2.85 
(2.44) 
 
-1.71 
(2.39) 
 
-4.32 
(2.80) 
-1.90 
(2.72) 
-4.34 
(2.15) 
b3 
DDIVYj⋅ 
SP500j  
0.74 
(2.76) 
1.52 
(2.74) 
0.70 
(2.55) 
1.30 
(2.29) 
 
0.45 
(1.73) 
 
1.43 
(2.55) 
1.05 
(2.17) 
1.09 
(1.38) 
b4 
SIZENj  
-0.001 
(3.91) 
-0.003 
(3.81) 
-0.001 
(2.82) 
-0.002 
(1.89) 
-0.001 
(2.40) 
-0.002 
(3.12) 
-0.001 
(2.54) 
0.000 
(0.49) 
b5 
LTYLDj  
0.12 
(3.22) 
0.28 
(3.79) 
0.13 
(3.51) 
0.31 
(3.98) 
0.12 
(4.72) 
0.17 
(1.82) 
0.13 
(4.21) 
0.18 
(2.09) 
b6 
Agej    
-0.0001 
(0.12) 
-0.0002 
(0.16) 
  0.001 
(1.11) 
0.002 
(1.23) 
b7 
LTVOLj    
0.003 
(1.50) 
0.008 
(2.06) 
  0.004 
(1.46) 
0.008 
(1.41) 
b8 
ILLIQj    
0.001 
(0.57) 
0.011 
(2.04) 
  0.009 
(1.34) 
0.027 
(1.94) 
b9 
ROAj   
0.005 
(0.76) 
-0.017 
(1.27) 
  0.003 
(0.55) 
-0.010 
(0.68) 
b10 
REPj   
0.009 
(0.73) 
-0.019 
(0.76) 
  0.013 
(0.69) 
0.007 
(0.18) 
Adjusted 
R2 7.3% 7.2% 7.3% 7.4% 
 
12.04% 
 
10.02% 
 
14.49% 
 
13.04% 
No. Obs 4507 4507 4237 4237 4507 4507 4237 4237 
 
Regressions of CARj, the two-day abnormal return on days 0 (the dividend announcement 
day) and +1, relative to the return on a portfolio of the size decile to which the stock 
belongs; and CAR13j, the cumulative abnormal return over days –11 to +1. Estimation is 
by pooled time-series and cross-section models, (5-1) and (6-1), and by year-by-year 
regressions (Fama-Macbeth method), models (5-2) and (6-2). DDIVYj is the increase in 
dividend yield of firm j, INSTj is institutional holding as a fraction of firm’s j outstanding 
shares at the end of the quarter before the dividend announcement is made, SP500j is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if firm j is included in the S&P 500 index, LTYLDj is the 
firm’s long-term yield in the year before the dividend announcement, SIZENj is the firm 
size deflated by the S&P 500 index (the base is 1962), AGEj is the number of years 
between the first observation in CRSP and this dividend announcement date (in 
logarithm).  LTVOLj is the standard deviation of monthly returns from month -24 to 
month -1.  ILLIQj, the stock illiquidity, is the daily ratio of absolute return to total dollar 
volume averaged over days -252 to -2.  ROAj is the return on assets (EBITDA/total 
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assets) and REPj is stock repurchase (equity repurchase/market capitalization at the end 
of the fiscal year), both for the year before the dividend increase announcement. The 
pooled model includes quarterly dummy variables and 57 industry dummy variables 
corresponding to 57 two-digit SIC industries. In the Fama-Macbeth annual regressions, 
there are 13 industry dummy variables (aggregation of groups of two-digit industries).   
In the pooled regressions, the t-statistics are calculated using White’s (1980) robust 
standard errors. In the Fama-Macbeth regressions, the model is estimated across stocks 
for each year y, y = 1980, … 1998.  The table presents the weighted means of the 19 
annual coefficients, the weights being the squared coefficient standard errors. The t-
statistics are calculated accordingly.  The critical t values are 2.10 for 5% two-tail test 
and 1.73 for 5% one-tail test. Estimation period: 1980-1998. 
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Table 4 
Changes in E∆INSTj, the excess change in institutional holdings around dividend increase 
announcements 
 
 
Quarter Mean t-statistic: 
difference 
from  
q = +1 
INSTj0-
weighted 
mean 
Proportion 
positive 
Quarterly 
mean 
INSTj0-
weighted 
quarterly 
mean 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
q = –2 0.00166 
(3.78) 
2.37 0.00305 
(4.55) 
0.514 
(1.92) 
0.00145 
(1.50) 
0.00217 
(2.08) 
q = –1 0.00246 
(5.45) 
3.55 0.00298 
(6.29) 
0.533 
(4.52) 
0.00271 
(2.32) 
0.00341 
(2.81) 
q =   0 0.00138 
(3.16) 
1.95 0.00044 
(0.98) 
0.520 
(2.70) 
0.00149 
(1.27) 
0.00059 
(0.48) 
q = +1 0.00012 
(0.25) 
 –0.00099 
(2.04) 
0.508 
(1.29) 
0.00010 
(0.09) 
–0.00088 
(0.76) 
 
E∆INSTj = ∆INSTj – ∆INSTm. ∆INSTj is the quarterly change in INSTj and ∆INSTm is the 
quarterly change in INST for all firms.  The figures are log(1+ E∆INSTj). 
The quarterly mean is the average over the quarters of each quarter’s average E∆INSTj. 
Quarter 0 is the quarter during which the dividend announcement is made. INSTj0 is 
measured after the dividend announcement. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. In column (d), the t-statistic is of a test that the proportion 
is different from 0.50. 
 38
Table 5 
The determinants of the likelihood of dividend changes 
 
 
Parameter 
Pooled 
regression 
Fama-
Macbeth 
θ1 
INSTj  
-0.15 
(3.01) 
-0.23 
(4.22) 
θ2 
SP500j  
-0.03 
(1.60) 
-0.05 
(2.53) 
θ3 
 LTYLDj 
-10.56 
(19.15) 
-9.18 
(7.96) 
θ4 
 DIFYLDj 
-31.22 
(48.28) 
-32.06 
(21.65) 
θ5 
 SIZENj 
0.07 
(8.52) 
0.07 
(9.34) 
θ6 
 PRCj 
0.13 
(7.23) 
0.12 
(5.87) 
θ7 
 LTVOLj 
-0.19 
(6.62) 
-0.23 
(5.75) 
 
Estimations of the pooled model (7-1) and the year-by-year model (7-2) (Fama-Macbeth 
method). The dependent variable equals +1, 0 or –1 if the dividend announcement for 
company j is, respectively, an increase, no change or decrease in dividend compared to 
the dividend in the previous quarter.  For variable definitions and model specification, see 
Table 3. DIFYLDj is the difference between the dividend yield of the last quarter before 
the dividend announcement and the long-term yield, and PRCj is the stock price (in 
logarithm) at the end of the quarter before the dividend announcement.  
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Table 6 
The effect of dividend surprise and institutional holdings on stocks’ CAR 
 
Panel a: Models (8-1) and (8-2) 
 
Pooled regression Fama-Macbeth 
 CAR CAR13 CAR CAR13
γ1 
DIVSURPj 
0.012 
(5.50) 
0.008 
(1.73) 
0.006 
(2.10) 
0.004 
(1.32) 
γ2 
INSTj 
-0.010 
(3.31) 
-0.024 
(3.75) 
-0.010 
(3.15) 
-0.023 
(4.27) 
γ3 
SP500j 
0.002 
(1.53) 
0.006 
(2.33) 
0.002 
(1.49) 
0.006 
(2.17) 
γ4 
SIZENj 
-0.0003 
(0.60) 
-0.0023 
(2.22) 
-0.001 
(0.95) 
-0.002 
(2.64) 
γ5 
LTYLDj 
0.124 
(3.44) 
0.345 
(4.61) 
0.164 
(5.76) 
0.276 
(3.39) 
Adj. R2 6.59% 6.45% 10.07% 8.40% 
 
 
Panel B: Models (9-1) and (9-2) 
 
Pooled regression Fama-Macbeth 
 CAR CAR13 CAR CAR13 
γ1 
DIVSURPj 
0.012 
(5.74) 
0.009 
(2.03) 
0.006 
(2.22) 
0.006 
(1.69) 
γ2 
DIVSURPj*INSTj 
-0.002 
(3.53) 
-0.005 
(3.91) 
-0.002 
(3.31) 
-0.005 
(4.39) 
γ3 
DIVSURPj*SP500j 
0.000 
(1.35) 
0.001 
(2.12) 
0.000 
(1.27) 
0.001 
(2.06) 
γ4 
SIZENj 
-0.0002 
(0.44) 
-0.0021 
(2.08) 
-0.001 
(0.81) 
-0.002 
(2.45) 
γ5 
LTYLDj 
0.125 
(3.46) 
0.347 
(4.64) 
0.163 
(5.74) 
0.275 
(3.36) 
Adjusted R2  6.61% 6.46% 10.09% 8.43% 
 
Regressions of CARj and CAR13j. Estimation is by a pooled time-series and cross-section 
model, (8-1) and (9-1), and year-by-year (Fama-Macbeth) model (8-2) and (9-2).  For 
variable definitions and model specification, see Table 3. DIVSURPj (the dividend 
surprise) is obtained from the ordered probit model (7) as the expectation of the structural 
residual conditional on the event.  
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Figure 1 
The pattern of CARy over time for dividend increases and decreases. 
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CARy is the yearly average of two-day cumulative abnormal return, days 0 and +1 (day 0 
is the dividend announcement day).  There are two figures, one for dividend increases 
and one for dividend decreases.  
The solid line depicts CARy for the year. The dashed line is the five-year moving average. 
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Figure 2 
The pattern of the dividend response coefficient over time for dividend increases 
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The figure plots the dividend response coefficient, α1, from the regression model   
(3) CARj = α0 + α1DDIVYj + α2SIZENj + α3LTYLDj + ej  .    
The model is estimated for each year across all dividend increase announcements during 
the year. CARj is the two-day cumulative abnormal return, days 0 and +1 (day 0 is the 
dividend announcement day). DDIVYj is the change in the dividend yield compared to the 
dividend yield in the quarter before the change. SIZENj is the stock capitalization 
normalized by the S&P 500 index.  LTYLDj is the stock’s long-term yield, in the year 
before the dividend announcement. 
The solid line depicts the estimated α1 for the year. The dashed line is the five-year 
moving average. 
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Figure 3 
Institutional holdings and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), day –11 to day +1 
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The CARs are averaged for three portfolios: high, medium and low institutional holdings. 
Stocks for which there is a dividend increase announcement in a quarter are allocated into 
one of the three portfolios according to the institutional holding of the stock.  
 
